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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Critics of the Fund have argued that IMF policy recommendations with their emphasis on 
fiscal adjustment—through a combination of tax increases and seemingly drastic reductions 
in public expenditures—have had a devastating effect on the poor. For example, Naiman and 
Watkins (1999) of the Center for Economic and Policy Research have argued that “there is 
an urgent need for increased attention to the provision of basic social services. However, IMF 
adjustment programs restrict access to health services and public education in two key ways: 
by reducing household incomes, and by reducing public (government) spending”. Similarly, 
the Bretton Woods Project (2004), a well-known critic of Washington-based international 
financial institutions notes that “in the face of public exhortations to greater spending on 
social services, low income country governments however find themselves trapped by Fund 
diktat on budget balances, inflation and interest rates.” Other NGO’s such as Global 
Exchange (2001) have pointed out that “the subordination of social needs to the concerns of 
financial markets has made it more difficult for national governments to ensure that their 
people receive food, health care, and education.” 
Although there are many statements about the negative impact of the IMF on social 
spending, there is very limited empirical evidence systematically assessing this question. 
This paper uses time-series cross-section data to investigate the impact of IMF-supported 
programs on public sector social spending and shed new light on this issue. Social 
expenditures are measured with annual data of government spending on health and education 
complied by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF
1 and verified and checked for 
accuracy by staff of country desks. The dataset covers 146 countries during the 
period 1985-2000. The basic statistical framework underlying the analysis relates social 
spending in a particular country and year to the presence of an IMF program that year and to 
a set of (control) variables that may also influence the levels of social spending.
2 In order to 
achieve results as robust as possible, we used four different indicators for education and 
                                                 
1 See Baqir (2002) for a description and coverage. 
2 That is, we will start by estimating an equation of the form:  
[1] Sit = Xitα + β*IMFit + εit  
where Sit measures social spending in country i in period t; IMFit is one or more variables 
indicating the presence of a Fund arrangement in period t; Xit is the set of control variables 
(e.g. all other factors determining S); and εit is an error term. The problems of this model 
(serial correlation and unit roots, endogeneity of Fund programs, etc.) and the possible 
mechanisms to deal with them are discussed below.   - 4 - 
health expenditures (Table 1): as share of GDP, as share of total government expenditures, as 
an index of real expenditures at domestic prices,
3 and in as expressed U.S. dollars per capita.
4  
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we describe the general characteristics of the 
dataset and compare the mean values of each indicator for periods with and without a Fund 
program. We then proceed to compare periods with and without a Fund program in the same 
country. This is useful as a reference point for the rest of the analysis, although it has severe 
limitations as a measure of the actual impact of IMF-supported programs on social spending.  
Second, we discuss ways of addressing these limitations and obtaining a better measure of 
the impact of IMF-supported programs on social spending. Third, we explore the sensitivity 
of the results to the selection of countries in the sample and to the econometric specification 
of the model. We conclude with a summary of the main lessons and findings, and also 
discuss the  limitations of our approach and identify possible areas for further research. 
II.   DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AND THE IMPACT OF IMF-SUPPORTED 
PROGRAMS 
An evolving focus 
In its first fifty years of operation, the IMF paid limited attention to social spending and 
social issues such as poverty and the distribution of income. The IMF’s role was to promote 
international monetary cooperation, the balanced growth of international trade, and to ensure 
a stable system of exchange rates. Although these fundamental institutional objectives are 
still in place,  in the late 1980s and 1990s social policy issues increasingly acquired more 
importance in the activities of the IMF.
5  
                                                 
3 In the absence of a sector-specific price index, social expenditures were deflated by the 
general consumer price index. expenditures in U.S. dollars were calculated at the annual 
average exchange rate, and delfated by the U.S. wholesale price index. 
4 It is not clear a priori that one indicator is better than others. Social expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP measure the overall macroeconomic importance of social expenditures 
using the size of the economy as a comparative benchmark. Social expenditures as a share of 
government spending provide a measure of fiscal priorities within the budget, and is thus a 
more direct indicator of the degree to which policy-makers wish to commit resources to the 
social sector. Finally, social expenditures per capita provide a better measure of the amount 
of direct or indirect resources that citizens receive from the state. 
5 For example, a pamplet on the IMF and the poor (IMF, 1998) notes that “in earlier periods 
the IMF’s policy advice emphasized the management of aggregate demand with the aim of 
creating conditions for macroeconomic stability. In recent years, the focus and the scope of 
the IMF’s work have broadened, and the structural and social aspects of fiscal policy have 
(continued…)   - 5 - 
Some recent empirical research by IMF staff suggests that average social spending in IMF-
supported programs over the last two decades has increased. For example Gupta et al. (2000) 
show that for 65 of the 107 countries with IMF-supported programs during 1985–97, 
government spending on education and health care increased, on average, both as a 
percentage of GDP and in real per capita terms.
6 
Over the last two decades there has been a large body of research focusing on the impact of 
IMF-supported programs.
7 Despite this large research output, we know of no studies that that 
have tried to isolate the impact of the IMF on social expenditures.
8 Though the neglect is 
understandable in retrospect, since social expenditures per se have not been at the core of the 
IMF’s areas of responsibility, their increased importance in both the IMF’s surveillance 
operations as well as program design now calls for greater attention. In the case of PRGF-
supported programs, poverty and social sectors issues have become central elements. Hence, 
we believe that, in providing the first systematic attempt to obtain rigorous and robust 
estimates of the impact of IMF-supported programs on social expenditures, this study 
provides a useful contribution in an area characterized by much controversy but limited 
empirical analysis.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
become increasingly important, both in programs that the IMF supports in members 
undertaking reforms (IMF-supported programs) and in its general policy advice.” 
6 The authors document how the share in GDP of spending increased by 0.3 percentage 
points during the program period (about eight years on average), while in per capita terms 
social spending increased by 2.4 percent a year. 
7 This has included work on the impact of Fund programs on growth: Bagci and Perraudin 
(1997), Barro and Lee (2002), Conway (1994), Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni and Schadler 
(2000), and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000); on fiscal adjustment: Bulir and Moon (2003); 
on income distribution: Garuda (2000); on private capital flows: Rodrik (1996), Bird and 
Rowlands (1997), and Ergin (1999). There has also been considerable work on other key 
macroeconomic issues such as inflation and the current account. 
8 Our work builds on previous research by Gupta, Clements, and Tiongson (1998) from the 
IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, who show that since the mid-1980s real per capita 
spending on education and health has increased on average, with comparable increases for 
countries that had IMF-supported adjustment programs. Their research provides useful 
insights into the evolution of social spending in IMF-supported programs, but their 
conclusions are based on a comparison of averages. Our methodology is seeking to go 
beyond their work by including statistical controls and dealing with the endogeneity of IMF-
Supported programs.   - 6 - 
Box 1. Issues in the Analysis of the Impact of IMF-Supported Programs. 
Goldstein and Montiel (1985) identified four desirable characteristics that any methodology trying to 
measure the impact of IMF-supported programs should have: (1) It should use information for a 
country “before-and-after” a IMF-Supported program and “with-and without” programs; (2) It should 
incorporate other domestic and international factors determining outcomes (control variables); (3) It 
should consider the determinants of domestic policies (policy reaction functions), to evaluate what 
outcomes would have been observed in the absence of a program; and (4) It should account for 
selectivity bias (endogeneity of Fund programs).
1/ The approach used in this paper meets only three of 
the criteria, since we do not discuss explicitly a policy counterfactual. However, such a counterfactual 
is less important for the type of “outcomes” considered here—social expenditures—than for the broad 
macroeconomic indicators (e.g. growth, inflation, current account) considered by Goldstein and 
Montiel and others. There is also a dilemma of including domestic policy variables
2/ among the 
controls: if they are not included, all their effect would be attributed to the IMF variable. Thus if 
countries without an IMF-supported program have better policies, on average, than those with 
programs, the estimated effect of the IMF variable would include the negative effect of bad policies. 
However, IMF programs affect domestic policies via conditionality and the general policy dialogue 
between the Fund and country authorities. Hence domestic policies are not exogenous to the presence 
of a Fund program and using them as controls runs the risk of ignoring a large part of their potential 
impact. One way of dealing with this is to use a policy reaction function as it provides a way of 
estimating how policies would differ with and without a IMF-Supported program.
3/ Our paper does 
not explicitly include domestic policy variables, as an initial analysis of the determinants of social 
expenditures found no significant association with potential candidates (e.g. different measures of 
monetary and exchange rate policies). This omission implies that our analysis does not identify the 
channels through which IMF-supported programs affect social expenditures. In practice, we are 
simply estimating the “total effect” of IMF arrangements, including any potential effect via changes 
in other policies which in turn affect social spending. An estimation of the channels (indirect effects) 
through which IMF-supported programs may affect social spending was beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
____________________ 
1/ The paper was mostly concerned with methodological issues, but it also included an empirical 
exercise comparing different ways of measuring the impact of IMF-supported programs. Mohsin 
Khan (1990) dubbed their approach the “generalized evaluation estimator” (GEE). The name seems 
to have stuck, although not always referring to a methodology with the four characteristics discussed 
above. For example, Khan emphasizes Goldstein’s and Montiel’s use of a policy reaction function. 
By contrast, Barro and Lee (2002) (who did not use this method) focus on the issue of sample 
selection bias as a defining characteristic of GEE. It is interesting to note that the empirical 
application in Goldstein and Montiel did not deal with the endogeneity issue—they just made some 
assumptions thought to be sufficient to eliminate the possibility of any sample selection bias. 
2/ E.g. monetary and exchange rate policies. 
3/ A different, and perhaps more difficult, question is what is the best way to estimate the policy 
reaction function. The method use by Goldstein and Montiel—estimating it with data for non-
program countries—provides some interesting insights but, as the authors themselves recognize, is far 
from perfect.   - 7 - 
Social spending and IMF-supported programs during 1985–2000 
There is considerable variation in the amount of resources that developing countries devote 
to public expenditures on health and education. Table 1 summarizes public spending levels 
on health and education measured in four possible ways: per capita (in U.S. dollars and in 
local currency units at constant prices), as a share of total public expenditures, and as a 
percentage of GDP. Figure 1 compares averages in these indicators for two groups: 
country/years when there is an IMF program (“with IMF”) and the rest (“without 
IMF”).
9, 10The averages for the two groups are very close—the “with IMF” group being 
slightly lower when social spending is measured as share of GDP, and slightly higher when 
measured as a share of total government expenditures.  
 
Table 1. Social Expenditure Variables (Indicators) Used in the Study 
Description Observations  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Health expenditure variables 
   
1. Share of GDP  1452  2.22  1.51 
2. Share of total expenditures  1462 7.25 3.82 
3. Per capita, at real domestic prices  
   (index, country average, 1985-2000=100)  1418  100  29.86 
4. Per capita, in U.S. dollars  1424 6.06 9.43 
Education expenditure variables   
5. Share of GDP  1452  4.17  1.98 
6. Share of total expenditures  1465  14.27  5.22 
7. Per capita, at real domestic prices  
   (index, country average, 1985-2000=100)  1413  100  25.28 
8. Per capita, in U.S. dollars  1419 10.20 14.84 
   Source: IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department.   
 
                                                 
9 Years with only part of a program are allocated to each group in proportion to the length of 
the period under each of the two conditions. E.g, if country X embarked on an IMF program 
in September 1, 1990, social spending in 1990 is included in the with and without groups 
with weights ¼ and ¾, respectively. Similarly, in the regression analysis, the IMF variable is 
defined as the share of the year under a Fund program. 
10 To make all indicators fit in the same scale, the figure shows the index at constant 
domestic prices divided by 100; i.e. the average for the 1985–2000 is set to 1.0, instead of 
100 as in Table 1 and subsequent regressions.   - 8 - 






Health/GDP Health/Expend. Educ/GDP Educ/Expend.
Without IMF With IMF
 
   Source: IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department 
 
This comparison of averages (Figure 1) provides an initial description of levels of social 
spending with and without IMF-supported programs; however, this information is hardly 
conclusive. For example, it cannot establish whether the differences depicted in the figure are 
(statistically) “significant.” Do the different levels of spending reflect fundamental 
differences associated with the presence of a IMF-Supported program? Or are they just 
random fluctuations for the particular sample of countries and periods representing each 
group? In other words, to the extent that other factors that may also affect spending are not 
controlled for, the observed differences could be spuriously associated with the IMF-
Supported program.
11 What is needed, therefore, is a more explicit statistical analysis, 
including controls for those variables which may influence social spending and that are 
simultaneously associated with the presence of an IMF arrangement. Before embarking on 
this analysis, we present some results from comparing periods with and without Fund 
program for each particular country, where the need for control variables is somewhat less 
pressing.
12 
                                                 
11 For example, IMF-supported programs are more prevalent in lower income countries (the 
average income per capita in the “with IMF” group is US$934, about one-third that of the 
“without IMF” group, US$2,722 which also spend less on health and education in U.S. 
dollars per capita, so it is not surprising that average social spending in U.S. dollars is smaller 
in the “with IMF” group. 
12 Ideally, it would have been better to start by running individual country regressions (in a 
fully specified model with all the theoretically relevant variables) for each country in the 
sample. Unfortunately, the data set covers a limited time period (T=15). Hence, there is a 
(continued…)   - 9 - 
Table 2 summarizes the results for the 92–94 countries for which there is enough data to 
compare periods with and without a IMF-Supported program. In the majority of cases there 
is no statistically significant difference between both periods.
13 Among the cases where there 
is a significant difference, the measures in shares of GDP or of total public expenditures 
show a majority of countries with higher education and health spending when there is a IMF-
Supported program, but a majority with lower spending in terms of U.S. dollars per capita. 
At constant domestic prices, more countries show higher health expenditures and lower 
education expenditures with an IMF program. 
 

















Health expenditure variables       
Countries with (statistically significant) higher 
spending when there is a Fund Program.  8  13  3  10  8.5 
Number of countries with no significant difference 
between years with and without Fund programs  78 76 83 75 78 
Countries with (statistically significant) lower 
spending when there is a Fund Program.  7  4  6  7  6 
Education expenditure variables       
Countries with (statistically significant) higher 
spending when there is a Fund Program.  7  11  1  8  6.75 
Number of countries with no significant difference 
between years with and without Fund programs  83  76  86  71  79 
Countries with (statistically significant) lower 
spending when there is a Fund Program.  5  8  6  14  8.25 
 
Table 2 thus indicates that in most countries (about 85 percent) there is no preponderance of 
evidence to show that social spending levels are systematically higher or lower during 
periods with IMF-Supported programs. And even in the cases where the results are 
significant, the evidence would be stronger if it were possible to control for other factors 
which might correlate with periods under an IMF arrangement. As discussed in the next 
                                                                                                                                                       
very small number of degrees of freedom for running individual country regressions, which 
would make it very difficult to obtain robust results. The alternative of running the 
regressions without controls is, to be sure, also problematic. Yet, it is sufficient for our initial 
purpose of providing some simple initial results on the basis of intra-country comparisons. 
13 At at least a 90 percent confidence level.   - 10 - 
section, this cannot be done properly with the limited number of observations available 
within each country. 
One possible solution to the limitations of the country by country analysis is to combine time 
series (observations of one unit of analysis at different points in time) with cross section data 
(observations of a number of units of analysis at the same point in time).
14 This would help 
us draw some empirical conclusions about what is likely to happen to social spending for an  
“average” country with a IMF-Supported program. 
III.   THE IMPACT OF IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS ON SOCIAL SPENDING: A TIME-SERIES 
CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS 
Initial issues 
To estimate the impact of the presence of an IMF-supported program on social spending, we 
need to address three potential sources of bias: 
(a) Missing variables. It is necessary to include variables that have an independent effect on 
spending and that may also be associated with the presence of an IMF-supported program. 
Failure to do so would attribute to the presence of a Fund program, effects that are really the 
product of these other variables.
15 The following control variables were defined using data 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the summary statistics, including means for the 




                                                 
14 This method of aggregating data has two important advantages. First, it produces a 
relatively large N. Hence, it overcomes the “degrees of freedom” problem that typically 
affects  individual country regressions. This allows the analyst to test for the effect of a large 
number of independent variables. Second, it pays attention to both longitudinal and cross-
sectional variations, and can therefore produce useful generalizations across both time and 
space. However, the method also relies on rather stringent assumptions (e.g. parameter 
heterogeneity) and can potentially suffer the combined pitfalls of cross-sectional analysis 
(e.g. heteroskedasticity) and time-series analysis (e.g. nonstationarity, serial correlation, etc.) 
15 “Omitted variables” bias is one of the most serious problems in econometrics. Unlike other 
problems such as heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity or serial correlation (without a lagged 
endogenous variable), omitting relevant variables leads to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates.  
16 Two of the control variables (health_priv and ca_y) had insignificant coefficients and were 
excluded from the final regressions.   - 11 - 
gdpusdpc   = GDP per capita in U.S. dollars 
health_priv   = private expenditures in health as share of GDP (percent) 
pop95young   = share of the population aged 0–14 (percent) 
pop95old  = share of the population 65 years or older (percent) 
growth   = annual rate of real growth (percent) 
grw_neg   = annual rate of growth, when it is negative (=0 otherwise) 
grw_sd  = variability (standard deviation) on the rate of growth  
ca_y  = current account deficit, share of GDP (percent) 
devaluation  = annual change on the real exchange rate (percent) 
democracy  = index of democracy from the Polity IV dataset
17 
 
The above control variables are important in accounting for the differences in social spending 
levels among countries. We discuss briefly the expected impact of some of these variables. 
First, we follow most empirical studies of the welfare state by including a measure of 
economic development to control for Wagner’s Law, according to which industrialization 
and modernization lead to an expansion of public activity over private activity. This occurs 
because in an increasingly complex society, the need for expenditures on regulatory activities 
grows. In addition, the demand for collective or quasi-collective goods—in particular 
education and culture—tends to be income elastic (i.e. its demand increases as income 
grows). As a result, as countries become wealthier, the state has to increase its supply of 
these goods, which would otherwise be undersupplied by the market.
18 Second, our model 
also includes three measures of changes in output levels (i.e. the annual rate of real GDP 
growth, a dummy for years of negative GDP growth, and a measure of output volatility) that 
are likely to affect the amount of resources that countries can devote to social spending. 
Finally, we also include a variable that measures “democracy” using a numerical scale. The 
scale measures the degree to which elections are free and fair and basic civil rights and 
liberties are respected by the state. Democracy is expected to have a positive impact on social 
expenditures for two reasons: (a) in a democratic regime political leaders are more dependent 
on the popular vote and, to the extent that social expenditures can be used to gain the support 
of important electoral constituencies, politicians are more likely to increase the resources 
they allocate to the social sector; and (b) democratic regimes tend to have better developed 
civil societies that can more effectively press the state for social protection. 
                                                 
17 The index is defined from Gurr’s AUTOC and DEMOC scores: democracy=1 when 
DEMOC–AUTOC > 4, following Brown and Hunter (1999). See also Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo (2001). 
18 Another possible analytic framework to study the relationship between economic 
development and the size of the public sector is Baumol’s cost disease (See for example 
Baumol, 1993). According to Baumol, real wages in the private and public sectors grow at 
roughly the same rate. However, because the public sector is labor-intensive and mainly 
service-oriented, productivity in this sector in fact grows at a lower rate than in the private 
sector. Hence, the relative size of government in the economy grows.    - 12 - 
These control variables can help explain some of the differences in spending between 
countries, but there may be residual country differences in spending not captured by them. To 
account for this possibility, the empirical model was also estimated with fixed effects, which 
allow for a different level of average spending for each country.
19 
(ii) Serial correlation and nonstationarity. Spending on social services tends to change 
sluggishly and be heavily affected by the level of spending during previous periods. This 
reflects not only the fact that most programs are often conceived as permanent or at least 
spanning several years, but also the political economy of budget allocation in which most 
programs have constituencies who resist change. For these reasons, changes in control 
variables (and IMF-supported programs) are likely to have an impact which is not 
instantaneous and may extend beyond one period. Thus, the empirical analysis should 
include a richer dynamics that distinguishes between short and medium term effects on social 
expenditures.  
The empirical analysis addressed this issue by including the following: 
•  The value of social spending in the previous year (lagged y, or LY), to account for the 
dependence of current spending on past allocations. 
•  The value of all control variables in the previous period (LX), as well as the change 
(difference) between current and previous period values (DX). This permits each 
control variable to have either just a transitory effect on the current period (variable 
DX), or an extended effect over several periods. 
•  Similar specification for the presence of a Fund program (lagged and difference: 
LIMF and DIMF), which allows for a richer dynamic on the impact of these 
programs. 
The above variables were then combined in an Autoregressive Moving Average process 
(ARIMA) which was sufficient to obtain independent and identically distributed residuals 
(IID). The structural equation of the ARIMA process is given by  
[2] Sit =  γLSi,t + LXit α0 + DXit α1 + β0LIMFit + β1DIMFit + uit  
where L is the lag operator (i.e., LZt≡ Zt-1, for any variable Z), D is the first-difference 
operator (D Zt ≡  Zt – Zt-1), and uit are the new independent and identically distributed 
residuals (IID), which are not affected by serial correlation. In order to disentangle short and 
medium-term effects, it is useful for analytical purposes to rewrite equation 2 as  
[2a]  DSit = DXit α1 + β1DIMFit + (1 – γ )( LXit α2 + LIMFit β2 –  LSit) + uit  
                                                 
19 The model was thus estimated using a dummy variables for each country.   - 13 - 
where (1 – γ )α2 = α1 and  (1 – γ )β2 = β1.  In this specification, changes in the dependent 
variables, DSit , can be seen as the result of two effects: contemporaneous changes in the 
explanatory variables (with an impact determined by the coefficients α1 and β1 ); and gradual 
adjustment to an “equilibrium” level of spending, determined by the coefficients α2 and β2). 
Transitory changes in the independent variables do not change the long run “equilibrium” 
level, so that the effect decays geometrically at the rate (1 – γ) after the second period 
(iii) Endogeneity of Fund programs. Countries only engage the Fund and agree to its 
monitoring when they have an urgent need to access the resources that it provides. Thus, 
years with a IMF-supported program are not “normal” years. The special factors leading to 
the presence of a program could also, in principle, have an independent impact on social 
expenditures. For example, a country could seek a Fund program as result of an external 
crisis (e.g. a large increase in the price of imports or a fall in export prices), and such a crisis 
is likely to require a reduction in government expenditures with or without the Fund.
20 
To address this issue, the following instruments were used to “predict” the presence of a 
program:  
•  Current account deficit as fraction of GDP in the previous year (as proxy of external 
crisis). 
•  Growth in the previous year (proxy of unsustainable expansion?).  
•  Income per capita (IMF-supported programs less likely on high income countries). 
•  Presence of a Fund program in the previous year. 
•  Government balance as share of GDP in the previous year. 
•  Democracy index (as in the control variables). 
 
                                                 
20 In the absence of any rigorous way of defining counterfactuals (i.e. deciding what would 
have been the level of government social expenditures under a given set of conditions with 
and without a Fund program), the standard way to improve the estimation of the coefficients 
of endogenous variables is to estimate these variable together with the original equation. As 
the main interest is in the spending equations, though, we do not need a full estimation of the 
likelihood of an IMF program: it is enough to estimate the regression using instrumental 
variables. It is also not critical to include all the determinants of the IMF variable, provided 
that the set of instrumental variables at least includes all the factors which potentially affect 
both, the presence of a program and the level of social spending, since these are the factors 
that biased the estimate of the IMF variable.    - 14 - 
IV.   RESULTS 
Table 3 presents regression results for the eight definitions of social spending, four for 
education and four for health. All eight indicators of health and education expenditures show 
positive coefficients for the contemporaneous and lagged values of the IMF variable; only 
three of the 16 coefficients are not significantly different from zero at least at a 90 percent 
confidence level (i.e. *, **, *** represent the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence intervals), 
and 5 are significant at 99 percent level. It is interesting that this seems to reflect a specific 
effort to protect these types of expenditures, as total public expenditures are not significantly 
different with a without the IMF (see Table A3 in Appendix).  
 
Table 3. ARIMA Model with Control Variables and Endogenous Fund Programs 
 
   Health   Education 
  GDP  Total Exp.  U.S. dollar pc  DP pc  GDP  Total Exp.  U.S. dollar pc DP pc 
(In percent) 
L Depend. Var.  0.577  ***  0.548  ***  0.748  ***  0.688  ***  0.604  ***  0.559  ***  0.662*** 0.743 ***
L.IMF(predicted)  0.179  ***  0.492  *  0.390  * 4.593  0.251  **  0.681  * 0.168 4.157  
D.IMF(predicted)  0.206  ***  0.636  **  0.395  **  9.736  ***  0.228  ***  0.748  ** 0.333 6.027 ** 
L.gdpusdpc  -0.030  * -0.027  0.014  -0.164  0.021  0.070  0.517 1.406  
D.gdpusdpc  -0.080  *** -0.093  1.101  ***  -2.761  ** -0.034  0.125  2.144*** 0.178  
L.devaluation  0.002  **  0.012  ***  0.010  ***  0.109  *** -0.001  0.001  0.011*** 0.007  
D.devaluation 0.001  0.008  ***  0.005  ***  0.046  * -0.001  0.000  0.005** -0.025  
L.year  0.011  ***  0.068  *** -0.002  1.219  ***  0.012  *  0.104  *** -0.012 0.686 ***
L.democracy 0.061  0.342  0.221  * 2.917  0.142  0.620  * 0.114 4.969  
D.democracy  0.009 0.308  0.072 1.784 0.035 0.428  0.056 2.852  
L.pop95young  -0.031  **  -0.015  -0.190 0.059 0.023 0.211  *** -0.190 1.593 ***
L.pop95old  -0.129  * -0.120  -1.980  *** -1.528  -0.116  -0.119  -3.745*** 3.560  
L.growth  0.013  * 0.028  0.073  **  1.521  *** -0.010  -0.047  0.050 0.779 ***
D.growth 0.005  0.019  0.033  0.895  ***  -0.021  *** -0.035  0.025 0.320  
L.grw_neg  -0.049  *** -0.060  -0.078  *  -1.736  *** -0.024  0.022  -0.045 -0.399  
D.grw_neg  -0.035  ** -0.025  0.000  -1.027  ** 0.004  0.036  0.060 0.236  
L.grw_sd  0.047  *** 0.000  0.386  *** -0.029  0.050  ** -0.118  0.955*** -0.831 * 
Number of obs  992  1001  992  992  989  1001  989 989  
R-squared  0.931 0.894  0.985 0.544 0.918 0.881  0.987 0.626  
Root MSE  0.408  1.375  1.209  20.56
9  0.597 1.952  1.761 15.59
1
 
   Note: See the text for variable definitions. An initial L indicates a lagged value and D the first difference. IMF(predict) is the estimated 
value of the IMF variable with the following instruments: lagged values of IMF, growth, CA/GDP, Government Balance/GDP, Democracy 
index and GDP per capita in U.S. dollars (pc= per capita and DP= domestic prices) . The actual estimated equation is.  
IMF(predicted) = 0.148 + 0.696 IMF(-1)  - 0.003 growth(-1) + 0.001 ca_y(-1)+ 0.001.cgbal(-1) – 0.043 democracy -0.011.gdpusdpc; N=1916 
(41.94***)               (-2.58***)               (-0.69)                (0.60)                (-3.26***)               (-4.85***)                R
2 = 0.522 
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Figure 2. Dynamic Effect of a Two-Year Fund Program 
Social Spending 








Health-Probit Educat - Probit
Real per capita spending as share 











Figure 2 uses the 
regression 
coefficients from 
Table 3 to simulate 
the impact of a 
two-year IMF-
supported program 
on health and 
education spending 
as share of GDP 
and at constant 
domestic prices. 
To prevent an 
excessive sense of precision, it also shows the results from one of the alternative estimates 
discussed in next section (Probit model).
21 The graphs shows the estimated change in 
education and health expenditures with respect to what they would have been in the absence 
of the two-year Fund program. Both types of social spending start to increase the first year of 
the program and have a larger increase in the second year; there is still a residual effect on 
the third year (i.e. after the end of the program), which declines geometrically at about 
40 percent a year from then on.  
The results of Table 3 stand in contrast with the ambiguous results for the group means in 
Figure 1 and the country time series reported in Table 2. Thus, it is particularly important to 
explore their robustness with respect to the estimation methodology and the country sample. 
This is the task of the next section. 
V.   ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of sensitivity analysis.
22 Specifically, we consider the 
following alternatives: 
•  Estimation methodology: 
1.  No correction for serial correlation or endogeneity of Fund programs. 
2.  Correction for Serial Correlation but not for endogenous Fund programs. 
                                                 
21 A probit model differs from the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimate used in Table 3 in 
explicitly constraining the predicted IMF variable to values between zero and one. 
22 See details in Table A1 in the Appendix.   - 16 - 
3.  Alternative correction for endogenous programs, to take into account that the 
proportion of the year under a program must be between zero and one (Probit 
model). 
•  Sub samples of countries: 
S1.  Excluding nonusers and moderate users: includes countries with at least one 
year but no more than six years of Fund programs 
S2.  Excluding non-users and chronic users: includes countries with at least one 
year but no more than ten years of Fund programs  
S3.  Only repeat users: includes countries with five or more years of IMF 
programs. 
By comparing alternative estimation techniques, i.e. different rows of Table 4, we see that the 
first two rows do not produce any strong conclusion about the impact of Fund programs on 
spending: either the coefficients are not significant or the number of positive coefficients are 
roughly on balance with the negative ones. There are, however, interesting differences in the 
four sub samples results shown in the first row, comparing spending with and without the 
Fund for each country separately. Among countries with five or more years of programs 
there is a much larger proportion of countries in which social spending are higher in years 
with programs. A more detailed analysis would be needed to evaluate hypothesis of why this 
is the case.




                                                 
23 E.g. it could be that those countries which are frequent clients are more prone to crisis, 
which could have a negative impact on social spending.    - 17 - 
 
Table 4. Summary of Robustness Analysis 
Sub samples according to total time under Fund programs during  
1985–2000 
 
S0: Complete Sample 
(N=146 countries) 
S1: One to Five 
years (N=53) 
S2:  One to Ten years 
(N=88) 
S3: Five or more 
years(N=64) 




For most countries no 
signficative difference 
between periods with and 
without Fund programs. 
Among countries where 
differences are 
significant; with Fund 
programs more countries 
had lower spending in 
U.S. dollars but more in 
the measures at domestic 
prices  
 
Small number of 
countries with 
significant results.  
Similar to the overall 
sample (S0), but with 
smaller number of 
countries with non-
significant difference  
with and without the 
Fund. 
Significant difference 
between years with and 
without programs in half 
of countries; among 
them, half have higher 
education spending when 
there is a Fund program, 
and two-thirds have 
higher health spending 
when there is a program. 
Pooled cross-section and time series data 
R2.  
No correction for serial 
correlation or 
endogeneity of Fund 
programs 
No significant difference 
with and without a Fund 
program, except for  
Health/Expend (+) and 
Education pc  in US$(-). 
High level of serial 





High level of serial 
correlation in the 
residuals. 
No significant 
difference except for 
Education per capita 
in US$ (--). 
High level of serial 
correlation in the 
residuals. 
No significant difference 
with and without a Fund 
program, except for  
Health/Expend (+) and 
Education pc  in US$(-). 
High level of serial 
correlation in the 
residuals.. 
R3.  
No correction for 
endogeneity of  Fund 
programs 
Health: significant 
positive impact in all 
definitions; 
Education: significant 
positive impact for GDP 






effect as share of 
GDP; others no 
significant. 
Health: significant 





positive impact in all 
definitions; 
Education: significant 




ARIMA model & 
instrumental var. 
(Table 3) 
All 16 coefficients for 
contemporaneous and 
lagged effects positive 
and all but 4 significant. 
No significant 
coefficient. 
All 16 coefficients 
for contemporaneous 
and lagged effects 
positive and all but 6 
significant. 
All 16 coefficients for 
contemporaneous and 
lagged effects positive 
and all but 2 significant; 
smaller in magnitude 
than in the Base Case 
 
R5.  
Probit model for Fund 
programs 
All 16 coefficients for 
contemporaneous and 
lagged effects positive 
and all but 3 significant; 
smaller in magnitude 
than in the Base Case 
No significant 
coefficient. 
All 16 coefficients 
for contemporaneous 
and lagged effects 
positive and all but 6 
significant; smaller in 
magnitude than in the 
Base Case. 
All 16 coefficients for 
contemporaneous and 
lagged effects positive 
and all but 2 significant; 
smaller in magnitude 
than in the Base Case 
The three lower rows of the table shows that the estimation technique does not have much 
effect on the qualitative results about the impact of Fund programs (the magnitude of the 
impact does change, as already illustrated in Figure 2).    - 18 - 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has argued that the popular view of the IMF leading to dramatic declines of social 
spending is not borne out by the available empirical evidence. In fact, the presence of an 
IMF-supported program tends to either maintain or increase social spending in health and 
education, measured as either a share of GDP, total expenditures or in real per capita terms. 
The effect is relatively small and short-lived and particularly significant for countries which 
are continuing (but not necessarily chronic) clients of the IMF. We found no significant 
difference between concessional and non-concessional programs. However, our analysis did 
not include indicators of actual health or educational outcomes. Hence, we presented no 
evidence of whether  the programs affect the efficiency of delivery of those services or their 
targeting. 
Our paper suggests three areas for further research. First, ours is the first attempt we know of 
to measure the impact of an IMF-supported program on social expenditure using an 
econometric model. Measuring the impact of the IMF is a very difficult task given the 
existence of a number or well-known statistical problems (e.g. endogeneity of Fund 
programs, parameter heterogeneity, serial correlation and unit roots, panel heteroskedasticity, 
etc.). Although we have been careful to test for the robustness of our results in a number of 
ways, given the number of potential methodological pitfalls that may affect the study of the 
impact of IMF-supported programs, the evidence we present can only be taken as tentative. 
Researchers that have attempted to measure the impact of the IMF on key macroeconomic 
variables (e.g. growth, the current account, inflation) often get contradictory results that are 
sensitive to the methodological choices they make. Hence, our evidence only leads to 
tentative conclusions. Much more analytical and empirical work is needed to evaluate more 
precisely the impact of IMF-supported programs on social spending. 
Second, the main limitation of our study is that it does not allow us to draw any conclusions 
about the impact of IMF-supported programs on the poor. As noted, social expenditures in 
developing countries vary enormously in terms of their equity, efficiency and sustainability. 
One obvious task for further research would be to try to unbundle the direct and indirect 
impact of IMF-supported programs on the poor using social expenditures as an intervening 
variable. For example, even if IMF-supported programs managed to maintain constant (or 
increase slightly) social expenditures during times of budgetary retrenchment, this might not 
be particularly helpful to protect the poor if expenditures on wages and salaries “crowd out” 
expenditures on goods and services that more directly benefit the poor. On the other hand, 
even if social expenditure levels declined, this might not lead to worse poverty indicators if 
the efficiency or targeting of expenditures increased. 
Finally, like all statistical studies, our analysis can point to associations among variables but 
cannot establish with precision what are the causal mechanisms at work. Hence, another 
useful way to expand our research would be to draw evidence from in-depth case studies 
where the transmission mechanisms between the presence of an IMF-supported program, 
social expenditures and poverty outcomes can be more effectively and convincingly 
established.   - 19 - 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics for the Control Variables for Social Spending 
 
 Group  means 
Variable Description  Number 




 IMF a/ 
ca_y  current account deficit, share of GDP (%)  2233 -4.610 11.937 -4.620 -4.583
democracy  index of democracy xxx  2336 0.519 0.500 0.562 0.409***
deval  annual change on the real exchange rate (%)  2235 4.274 35.062 4.519 3.665 
gdpusdpc  GDP per capita in U.S. dollars  2265 2.214 3.075 2.722 0.934***
growth  annual rate of real growth (%)  2264 2.720 6.791 2.574 3.086 
grw_neg 
annual rate of growth, when it is negative (=0 
otherwise) 2264 -1.275 4.207 -1.444 -0.848***
grw_sd 
variability (standard deviation) on the rate of 
growth   2272 5.250 3.693 5.430 4.794***
health_priv  private expenditures in health as share of GDP (%) 994 2.241 1.412 2.206 2.302 
pop95old  share of the population 65 years or older (%)  2144 5.141 3.217 5.195 5.014 
pop95young  share of the population aged 0-14 (%)  2160 36.860 8.716 36.181 38.482***
population  total population (millions)  2265 30.439 124.400 34.930 19.125** 
reg_AFR  2336 0.301 0.459 0.244 0.450***
reg_APD  2336 0.171 0.377 0.201 0.095***
reg_EU1  2336 0.096 0.295 0.108 0.065***
reg_EU2  2336 0.103 0.304 0.103 0.103 
reg_WHD 
regional dummy for countries in each of IMF 
Departments: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe I, 
Europe II (countries of the former Soviet Union in 
Europe and Central Asia) and Western 
Hemisphere (America). AFR is used as reference 
in the regressions  2336 0.205 0.404 0.201 0.217 
year  Years, from 1985 to 2000.  2336
1992.5
0 4.61 1992.11 1993.52 ***
   
   Note 
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Table A2. IMF-Supported Programs and Total Public 
Spending. 
 
     Total Expenditures 
  Percent of GDP U.S. dollar pc DP pc
L Depend. Var.  0.610***  0.619*** 0.757*** 
L. IMF(predict) 0.117  0.050  -0.144 
D. IMF(predict)  0.001  0.941  0.864 
L. gdpusdpc  -0.076  1.581  1.116 
D. gdpusdpc  -0.567  24.923*** 0.582 
L. devaluation -0.006  0.048  -0.039* 
D. devaluation  -0.012*** 0.014  -0.060*** 
L. year  -0.068* -0.307  0.231* 
L. democracy -0.432  0.268  -1.202 
D. democracy  0.061  0.180  0.018 
L. pop95young  0.769***  -4.386*** 0.599 
L. pop95old -0.911  -54.201*** 4.862 
L. growth  -0.122** 0.203  0.668*** 
D. growth  -0.181*** 0.067  0.122 
L. grw_neg 0.142  -0.019  0.420 
D. grw_neg  0.231** 0.179  0.997*** 
L. grw_sd  -0.754*** 2.230  -0.389 
Number of obs  1294  1294  1294 
R-squared 0.902  0.983  0.629 
Root MSE  3.792  19.54  12.52 
  
   Note: a/ Statistically significant differences in means are indicated by *** (99 percent 
confidence level) or **(95percent). 
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Table A3. List of Countries and Sub samples 
  Years     
Country  IMF S1 S2 S3 
Albania  5.71 S1 S2 S3 
Algeria 4.81  S1  S2   
Angola  0.00    
Argentina 11.76      S3 
Armenia 4.48  S1  S2   
Azerbaijan 4.13  S1  S2   
Bahamas,  The  0.00    
Bahrain  0.00    
Bangladesh  6.59 S1   S3 
Barbados 1.31  S1  S2   
Belarus 1.00  S1  S2   
Belize 1.24  S1  S2   
Benin  9.61 S1   S3 
Bhutan  0.00    
Bolivia 12.10      S3 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  1.00       
Botswana  0.00    
Brazil  6.35 S1   S3 
Bulgaria  7.34 S1   S3 
Burkina  Faso  9.77 S1   S3 
Burundi  5.26 S1 S2 S3 
Cambodia 3.56  S1  S2   
Cameroon  7.86 S1   S3 
Cape Verde  1.16  S1  S2   
Central African Republic  2.45  S1  S2   
Chad  8.23 S1   S3 
Chile 3.02  S1  S2   
China  0.00    
Colombia 1.03  S1  S2   
Comoros 2.45  S1  S2   
Congo,  Dem. Rep. Of  4.42  S1  S2   
Congo, Republic  of  5.41  S1  S2  S3 
Costa  Rica  6.59 S1   S3 
Cote d’Ivoire  10.94      S3 
Croatia 4.50  S1  S2   
Cyprus  0.00    
Czech Republic  1.00    
Djibouti 2.37  S1  S2   
Dominica      
Dominican  Republic      
Ecuador      
Egypt      
El  Salvador      
Equatorial  Guinea      
Eritrea      
Estonia      
Ethiopia      
Fiji      
Gabon  9.20 S1   S3 
Gambia,  The  8.55 S1   S3 
Georgia 4.08  S1  S2     - 25 - 
Table A3. List of Countries and Sub samples 
  Years     
Country  IMF S1 S2 S3 
Ghana 11.78      S3 
Grenada 1.64  S1  S2   
Guatemala 2.59  S1  S2   
Guinea 13.38      S3 
Guinea  Bissau  0.00    
Guyana 10.12      S3 
Honduras  6.29 S1   S3 
Hungary  7.75 S1   S3 
India 1.66  S1  S2   
Indonesia 3.16  S1  S2   
Iran  0.00    
Jamaica  9.73 S1   S3 
Jordan  9.42 S1   S3 
Kazakhstan  6.05 S1   S3 
Kenya  6.99 S1   S3 
Kiribati  0.00    
Korea 4.90  S1  S2   
Kuwait  0.00    
Kyrgyz  Republic  7.12 S1   S3 
Lao  PDR  6.63 S1   S3 
Latvia  7.13 S1   S3 
Lebanon  0.00    
Lesotho  8.72 S1   S3 
Liberia 1.43  S1  S2   
Libya  0.00    
Lithuania  5.74 S1 S2 S3 
Macedonia FYR  3.41  S1  S2   
Madagascar  9.63 S1   S3 
Malawi 10.13      S3 
Malaysia  0.00    
Maldives  0.00    
Mali 13.38      S3 
Malta  0.00    
Marshall  Islands  0.00    
Mauritania 12.16      S3 
Mauritius 1.50  S1  S2   
Mexico  8.30 S1   S3 
Moldova  5.29 S1 S2 S3 
Mongolia  6.29 S1   S3 
Morocco  5.95 S1 S2 S3 
Mozambique 10.52      S3 
Myanmar  0.00    
Namibia  0.00    
Nepal  6.24 S1   S3 
Netherlands  Antilles  0.00    
Nicaragua 4.99  S1  S2   
Niger 10.96      S3 
Nigeria 3.90  S1  S2   
Oman  0.00    
Panama  7.93 S1   S3 
Papua New Guinea  4.60  S1  S2     - 26 - 
Table A3. List of Countries and Sub samples 
  Years     
Country  IMF S1 S2 S3 
Paraguay  0.00    
Peru  8.27 S1   S3 
Philippines 11.92      S3 
Poland  5.83 S1 S2 S3 
Qatar  0.00    
Romania  5.15 S1 S2 S3 
Russia  5.37 S1 S2 S3 
Rwanda  5.13 S1 S2 S3 
Samoa  0.52    
Sao Tome & Principe  3.18  S1  S2   
Saudi  Arabia  0.00    
Senegal 13.93      S3 
Seychelles  0.00    
Sierra  Leone  6.87 S1   S3 
Slovak Republic  1.67  S1  S2   
Solomon  0.00    
South  Africa  0.00    
Sri  Lanka  6.27 S1   S3 
St. Kitts and Nevis  0.00       
St.  Lucia  0.00    
Suriname  0.00    
Swaziland  0.00    
Syria  0.00    
Tajikistan 3.18  S1  S2   
Tanzania 10.09      S3 
Thailand 4.63  S1  S2   
Togo 12.07      S3 
Tonga  0.00    
Trinidad & Tobago  2.07  S1  S2   
Tunisia 4.49  S1  S2   
Turkey 2.45  S1  S2   
Turkmenistan  0.00    
Uganda 11.66      S3 
Ukraine  5.08 S1 S2 S3 
United Arab Emirates  0.00       
Uruguay  8.47 S1   S3 
Uzbekistan 1.24  S1  S2   
Vanuatu  0.00    
Venezuela 4.00  S1  S2   
Vietnam 3.30  S1  S2   
Vincent & the Grenadines  0.00       
Yemen 4.60  S1  S2   
Zambia  7.48 S1   S3 
Zimbabwe  6.12 S1   S3 
 